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3213 
“HELPLESS” GROUPS 
Troy A. McKenzie* 
 
“Courts of equity have a tradition of aiding the helpless, such as infants, 
idiots and drunkards.  The average security holder in a corporate 
reorganization is of like kind.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
This Essay considers the idea of the “helpless” group—that is, the group 
comprising individuals who are thought to be incapable of protecting their 
own interests.  That idea plays a particularly important role in the history of 
the modern class action, which has been justified as a device providing 
redress for “small claims held by small people.”2  The helpless group is at 
once hero and victim.  The group serves as champion of the law by seeking 
to vindicate its rights.3  At the same time, the group may be preyed upon by 
the party opposing it and, potentially, by its own counsel.  Indeed, courts, 
whether in the class action4 or in the new world of nonclass aggregate 
litigation,5 are called upon to give special protection to the helpless group 
for that reason. 
But the rhetoric of helplessness can be muddled and contradictory.  It is 
muddled because it collapses a number of different concepts that should be 
explored separately.  Sometimes, the image of the helpless group is invoked 
when discussing a group of individuals who are not helpless in the ordinary 
sense of the word.  They may be fully capable of participating in the 
litigation but are rationally indifferent to it—either because they hold 
negative value claims or because the group’s claims are, for idiosyncratic 
reasons, ones that individual group members may not wish to pursue.  At 
other times, the image of the helpless group is invoked to justify searching 
judicial oversight of lawyers.  The rhetoric of helplessness under those 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. 
 1. Jerome Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate 
Reorganization, 19 VA. L. REV. 541, 569 (1933). 
 2. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:  1966 Amendments of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 397–98 (1967) (discussing 
opt-out classes). 
 3. Id.; see also William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?:  A Positive 
Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 714 (2006). 
 4. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 5. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491–94 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
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circumstances serves principally to highlight the perceived failings of 
counsel owing a fiduciary obligation to the group. 
There is also a contradictory side to the image of helplessness.  It can 
hobble aggregation in many cases where the group is most able to give 
voice to its preferences and to push back against the misdeeds of its 
lawyers.  Precisely when a group shows evidence of being something other 
than defenseless, that evidence may be used to disfavor group litigation.6  
Mass tort class actions, for example, were attacked in part because they did 
not fit the perceived image of helpless individuals who needed the 
protection of a group litigation device.7  This is not to say that we should 
ignore any of these considerations.  Rather, the underlying concerns at play 
in assessing the needs of claimants, their opponents, and the civil justice 
system should be laid bare. 
This Essay draws from the development of bankruptcy law and, 
specifically, from the law governing business reorganizations.  Bankruptcy 
serves as a case study in the rhetoric of helplessness.  Odd as it may seem, 
the concern about helpless individuals corralled into a group and preyed 
upon by their adversaries and their own lawyers originated in bankruptcy 
before it made its way to the world of the class action.  The system of 
business reorganization that developed in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries—the equity receivership—relied heavily on the participation of 
committees representing various classes of creditors and equity holders 
during the negotiated resolution of a firm’s financial distress.  In theory, 
those committees acted on behalf of the groups they represented, although 
in practice they were often dominated by the insiders who controlled the 
reorganization process—corporate debtors’ managers, bankers, and 
lawyers. 
To highlight the exploitation of security holders in large business 
reorganizations, reformers emphasized the isolation and helplessness of the 
typical creditor, such as a bondholder with a small stake in the 
reorganization.8  During the New Deal, those reformers successfully 
 
 6. See, e.g., Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 496 & n.28 (E.D. Pa. 1997) 
(describing the litigation as “Goliath versus Goliath” and concluding that a class action 
would not be superior to other means of adjudication). 
 7. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation:  Paradigm 
Misplaced, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 581 (1994) (“[M]ass tort cases do not pit downtrodden, 
defenseless claimants against such big, impersonal governmental institutions as prisons, 
school systems, and mental health facilities.”). 
 8. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Reorganization Through Bankruptcy:  A Remedy for 
What?, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1100, 114 (1935) (describing the concern that “the average small 
bondholder, not knowing where else to turn in his need of finding someone who would act 
for him,” could be manipulated by those who controlled the reorganization process); Roger 
S. Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Reorganization, 44 YALE L.J. 923, 948 (1935) (“It is 
probable that in many instances the reorganizers counted on the ignorance and inertia of 
scattered bondholders, and upon extra-legal pressure to compel general acceptance of . . . 
[the reorganizers’] plans.); Frank, supra note 1, at 568 (“The bulk of the security holders [in 
a reorganization] are inevitably uninformed and usually concur in a plan presented to them 
by the reorganizers because of lack of information and lack of any practical alternatives.”).  
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overthrew the receivership and replaced it with a form of business 
reorganization that strictly limited the participation of formal, representative 
committees of creditors. 
The reformers’ justification for that radical change was that individual 
creditors were so ill equipped to monitor the process that creditors’ 
committees would, inevitably, fall prey to the machinations of insiders.9  
Rather than design a more robust committee system that attempted to 
counterbalance insider control and thereby give creditors more say in the 
process, the reformers abandoned group representation in large corporate 
bankruptcies.  Instead, the reforms aimed to replace the committee system 
with a single guardian—a neutral trustee—under the supervision of an 
administrative agency (the SEC).10 
The result was a failure.  The “reformed” bankruptcy process that 
emerged from the New Deal era proved to be unsatisfactory to debtors and 
creditors alike.  Rather than facilitating the resolution of firms’ financial 
distress, the reforms made it much more difficult because bargaining among 
the various interests at stake became too unwieldy without the mediating 
influence of organized committees.11  When the bankruptcy system 
underwent its next major overhaul in the 1970s, the New Deal approach to 
corporate reorganizations was abandoned in favor of a return to a 
(modified) pre–New Deal model of group resolution.12 
This historical note has implications beyond bankruptcy.  The early 
academic thinking that shaped the current form of the class action was 
heavily influenced by the New Deal era bankruptcy reformers.  Indeed, the 
seminal law review article about the class action, written shortly after the 
New Deal overhaul of the bankruptcy system, began with a discussion of 
the problem of the individual creditor in a business reorganization case.13 
A number of lessons can be drawn from the bankruptcy experience of 
group organization.  First, it is necessary to pierce through the rhetoric of 
the helpless group in order to appreciate what features of a particular group 
of individual claimants are thought to render them unable or unwilling to 
participate effectively in litigation.  The New Deal reformers assumed that 
small investors holding small claims in corporate bankruptcies would be 
indifferent to the running of the case.14  They failed to recognize, however, 
the heterogeneous nature of the community of creditors in a large 
bankruptcy case.  Second, greater attention should be paid to ways in which 
the voice of groups can be harnessed effectively.15  When the New Deal era 
 
 9. See infra Part I.A.1.  
 10. See infra Part I.A.2.  
 11. See infra Part II.A.  
 12. See infra Part II.B.  
 13. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class 
Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684–85 (1941). 
 14. See infra Part I.A.1.  
 15. There are, of course, scholars who have given careful study to that problem. See 
generally, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2008); 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together:  Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations, 
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reforms of the bankruptcy system were abandoned, creditors’ committees 
were reintroduced as a form of monitor and as a semi-legislative outlet for 
claimants.  There is much to criticize in the use of creditors’ committees 
today in bankruptcy, but the more recent history of the committee system 
demonstrates that they play a valuable role in enhancing the group 
resolution process in bankruptcy cases.  The class action, on the other hand, 
remains inhospitable to forms of organization that draw on subgroup 
representation of the same sort.16  Nevertheless, the developing form of 
procedural aggregation that lies outside the formal certification of a class 
action may once again open the doors to rethinking group representation. 
I.  THE HELPLESS GROUP AND PROCEDURAL REFORM 
In 1941, Harry Kalven and Maurice Rosenfield wrote perhaps the most 
influential law review article on the class action.17  Published shortly after 
Hansberry v. Lee,18 the Supreme Court’s landmark decision on due process 
in representative suits, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit 
explored routes for reforming the class action.19  The article provided as its 
principal insight a model of the class as a group with a shared interest,20 a 
conceptual innovation that the authors offered as a challenge to the more 
limited traditional view of the proper role of class suits.21  The model put 
 
91 B.U. L. REV. 87 (2011) [hereinafter Burch, Litigating Together]; Jack B. Weinstein, The 
Democratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451 
(2012); see also Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis:  Mass Tort Litigation as 
Network, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 863. 
 16. To be sure, claimants are not completely voiceless in class actions, as the role of 
individual objectors demonstrates. 
 17. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 13.  For a discussion of the article’s influence, see 
Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State:  Kalven and Rosenfield 
Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 603 (2008); Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights 
Movement, and the Silent Litigation Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1978–79 (2004). 
 18. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
 19. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 13, at 701–07 (criticizing the then-current 
version of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 20. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109, 
1128 (2011) (discussing Kalven and Rosenfield’s model of the class action); see also 
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 
232 (1987) (observing that Kalven and Rosenfield “embrace[d] the interest definition of the 
class, requiring no more than an (assumedly) shared interest in recouping losses”). 
 21. Kalven and Rosenfield heaped particularly harsh criticism on the then-recently 
promulgated Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—or, at least, on the 
interpretation of the Rule offered by Yale Law School Professor J. W. Moore, who was one 
of its drafters.  Moore, a bankruptcy scholar as well as an expert on civil procedure, insisted 
that the 1938 version of the Rule contemplated only three types of class actions depending 
on the preexisting legal relationship among the class members. 2 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE 2235 (1st ed. 1938).  Moore called these three categories the “true” class 
action, in which members of the class held a joint or common right; the “hybrid” class 
action, in which the class members’ rights were several but involved claims to property that 
required common distribution or management; and the “spurious” class action, in which the 
class action served as a permissive joinder device. Id. at 2235–41.  Kalven and Rosenfield 
showed that these categories were unhelpful in achieving the desired end of effective and 
inclusive group resolution, because they either duplicated existing procedures or applied 
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forward by Kalven and Rosenfield sought to give a realistic assessment of 
the dynamics of widely dispersed groups of claimants who lacked prior 
communal ties.  When those groups comprised individuals who, although 
sharing a common interest, were “isolated, scattered, and utter strangers to 
each other,” a procedural intervention was necessary to bring them together 
and make recovery possible.22 
Ultimately, the authors settled on the solution of a reformed class suit, 
brought by any one member of the class without the need to solicit other 
class members’ consent, with an emphasis on the benefits of maximizing 
the inclusion of claimants.23  Before reaching that conclusion, however, 
Kalven and Rosenfield first considered a model of group organization 
drawn from business reorganization cases—the committee—and rejected it.  
Why they did so has a fascinating historical explanation that deserves to be 
retold. 
A.  The Helpless Group in Bankruptcy 
Those who have not recently re-read Kalven and Rosenfield’s seminal 
work probably do not recall that it begins with an examination of 
developments in bankruptcy law.24  That was not as odd then as it may 
seem now.  When Kalven and Rosenfield first advocated broader use of the 
class action in 1941, the law of corporate reorganizations had recently 
undergone a massive reworking, driven by the perceived mistreatment of 
the individual investor in bankruptcy cases.  The SEC had undertaken a 
lengthy investigation of corporate reorganizations in the 1930s, and the 
agency’s report, whose final part was published one year before Kalven and 
Rosenfield’s article, painted a grim picture of security holders 
systematically exploited by corporate debtors and those who controlled the 
group resolution process of corporate reorganizations.25  The SEC Report 
recounted the plight of “the single and isolated security holder” who was, in 
most cases, “helpless in protecting his own interests or pleading his own 
cause.”26  Kalven and Rosenfield chose that quotation from the SEC Report 
to frame the opening passages of their article.27 
 
only to cases of limited importance. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 13, at 705 (“[T]he 
rule performs three functions as interpreted by Moore.  That of the ‘true’ class suit, no one 
any longer cares about; that of the ‘hybrid’ suit is well taken care of through another 
procedure entirely, and the ‘spurious’ simply duplicates a task already performed by another 
section of the rules.”). 
 22. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 13, at 688. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. at 684. 
 25. SEC REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, 
PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (1936–
1940) [hereinafter SEC REPORT].  Congress directed the SEC to produce the report, which 
appeared in eight parts over several years, in a provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 211, 48 Stat. 881, 909, 
repealed by Pub. L. No. 100-181, tit. 3, § 330, 101 Stat. 1249, 1259 (1987). 
 26. 2 SEC REPORT, supra note 25, at 1. 
 27. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 13, at 684. 
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At the time, advocates of group litigation reform naturally would have 
looked to bankruptcy law for guidance, because the dynamics of group 
resolution had received a great deal of academic and legislative attention in 
reorganization cases.  The SEC Report had prompted Congress to overhaul 
the bankruptcy laws in 1938.  The resulting legislation, the Chandler Act,28 
marked a complete break with the former operation of corporate 
reorganization law.  Prior to the Chandler Act, corporate reorganizations 
had operated through equity receiverships, a nineteenth-century confection 
created by judges and lawyers that was later codified but largely 
unchanged.29  A receivership comprised three basic building blocks:  (i) the 
court-ordered appointment of a receiver (a form of prejudgment attachment 
in which a third party was placed in control of the debtor’s assets, thereby 
preserving the assets from dissipation); (ii) the organization of “protective 
committees” to represent and bargain on behalf of various classes of those 
with claims against, or interests in, the debtor; and then (iii) the sale of the 
debtor’s assets in a stylized (and usually fictional) auction at which 
protective committees would successfully bid, using the assembled claims 
of creditors as currency.30  Although a receivership took the formal 
appearance of the seizure and sale of the debtor’s property to satisfy 
creditors, it developed in practice into a method for negotiating the 
reorganization of a corporate debtor’s financial distress.31  The sale 
terminated the debtor’s prior obligations and replaced them with a new 
capital structure negotiated during the receivership as part of a plan of 
reorganization. 
1.  Control and Corruption in Group Representation 
In Kalven and Rosenfield’s day, New Deal reformers had targeted 
reorganizations for sustained criticism because of the perceived mismatch 
 
 28. 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978). 
 29. See generally Jeffrey Stern, Failed Markets and Failed Solutions:  The Unwitting 
Formulation of the Corporate Reorganization Technique, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 783 (1990) 
(describing the development of the equity receivership).  
 30. Paul D. Cravath, Reorganization of Corporations; Bondholders’ and Stockholders’ 
Protective Committees; Reorganization Committees; and the Voluntary Recapitalization of 
Corporations, in SOME LEGAL PHASES OF FINANCING, REORGANIZATION, AND REGULATION 
153, 157–81 (1917) [hereinafter SOME LEGAL PHASES] (setting out in detail the stages of an 
equity receivership).  Before the sale, the various protective committees would assemble into 
a single reorganization committee holding the vast majority of claims against the debtor.  See 
James Byrne, Foreclosure of Railroad Mortgages, in SOME LEGAL PHASES, supra at 77, 142.  
Because the reorganization committee could bid its claims but an outside bidder would have 
to put up a large cash bid, the reorganization committee typically became the only possible 
purchaser of the debtor’s assets. See Frank, supra note 1, at 554–55 (explaining that “while 
theoretically the judicial sale is an open sale at public auction, actually there is only one 
possible purchaser—the reorganization committee”).  A newly organized entity would serve 
as the vessel holding the “purchased” assets. 
 31. As the Supreme Court described the process, a receivership had become “the 
machinery by which arrangements between the creditors and other parties in interest are 
carried into effect, and a reorganization of the affairs of the corporation under a new name 
brought about.”  Canada S. Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 539 (1883). 
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between the interests of widely dispersed creditors and the actions of a 
concentrated group of professionals who ran the receivership process.  The 
receivership system was derided as corrupt and ineffectual.  It was corrupt 
because insiders—corporate managers, their bankers, and their lawyers—
were said to control the process for their own benefit at the expense of 
creditors.32  It was ineffectual because the protective committees were said 
to fail in effectively representing their constituents.33  In a typical 
receivership, the professionals organizing the case would solicit, say, 
individual bondholders to give their proxy to the committee representing 
that particular class of bonds.34  A bondholder who dissented from the 
resulting plan of reorganization negotiated by the committee could 
withdraw that proxy.35  But New Deal critics viewed this elaborate dance as 
a sham because individual security holders were likely to be too 
unsophisticated to make a meaningful choice in authorizing the formation 
of the committee or in evaluating the resulting plan of reorganization.36  
And once control had been given over to the committee, the investor had 
little say in the outcome of the reorganization.  An investor who withdrew 
his securities from the committee would likely receive little or nothing in 
the reorganization and have to pay an assessment to the committee to 
boot.37  In the words of one prominent critic, the process led to “the foisting 
of unfair plans upon masses of innocent investors, helplessly unorganized, 
or hopelessly uninformed.”38 
The SEC Report elaborated on why reorganization committees had so 
often failed to protect the interests of the security holders they represented.  
First, the report noted the lack of sophistication of many creditors in 
corporate reorganization cases.  Thus, the committee system was ineffective 
when creditors were “uninformed and unskilled in the intricacies of 
finance.”39  Second, the report posited that investors had little incentive to 
 
 32. In pressing their objections to the receivership system, reformers deployed case 
studies of receiverships and the apparent self-dealing by the professionals who controlled the 
reorganization process. See, e.g., MAX LOWENTHAL, THE INVESTOR PAYS 120–30 (1933) 
(describing the conflicted relationships among managers, bankers, and lawyers involved in 
the receivership of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad).  The SEC 
elaborated on a variety of benefits that insiders gained from the process—what the agency’s 
report termed “the emoluments of control.” 1 SEC REPORT, supra note 25, at 4.  These 
emoluments included fees paid out of the debtor’s estate. 
 33. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 32, at 187–95 (giving examples of the control exercised 
by reorganization professionals over protective committees). 
 34. The actual mechanism required the bondholder to deposit securities with the 
committee in accordance with a deposit agreement, which in turn authorized the committee 
to undertake various actions in the reorganization process.  Paul Cravath, a leading 
reorganization lawyer of his day, provides one of the most detailed accounts of the formation 
of committees and the operation of deposit agreements. See Cravath, supra note 30, at 161–
74. 
 35. See id. at 168.  The dissenter nevertheless had to make a contribution toward the 
expenses incurred by the committee.  
 36. See Alfred B. Teton, Reorganization Revised, 48 YALE L.J. 573, 573 (1939). 
 37. 8 SEC REPORT, supra note 25, at 310. 
 38. See Teton, supra note 36, at 573.  
 39. 2 SEC REPORT, supra note 25, at 1. 
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monitor the conduct of committees when an individual investor’s 
“investment is so small that it becomes either impossible or improvident for 
him to expend the funds necessary to prosecute his claims or defend his 
position.”40  In essence, the report explained that many creditors in 
bankruptcy cases held negative value claims that they had little economic 
incentive to pursue.41 
These criticisms of the committee system of group organization in 
reorganization cases were not new.  Indeed, the principal author of the SEC 
Report, William O. Douglas, had written a Harvard Law Review piece that 
outlined similar concerns three years earlier.42  Douglas’s article, which 
focused on railroad reorganization cases, described the committee system as 
valuable but prone to abuse without reform.43  Because of the low stakes 
held by a typical claimant, insiders could foist themselves on the group and 
gain control of the committee system for their own benefit.  He proposed 
curbing the power of insiders—such as the debtor’s managers and 
bankers—in order to give committees of small security holders a real voice 
in the reorganization process.44 
Douglas explored various methods of ensuring a more vigorous and 
democratic committee system.  He made a favorable reference to a proposal 
by Professor Roger Foster that would have treated the process of committee 
formation much like the formation of a government in a democratic 
republic.45  Claimants would elect from a slate of nominees in an open 
process their representatives to exercise control during the negotiation of a 
plan of reorganization.46  An agency could serve as a check against self-
dealing during the process. 
In Douglas’s view, then, the committee system would benefit from a 
leader to champion the interests of small stakeholders and check the power 
 
 40. Id.  
 41. William O. Douglas, the principal architect of the SEC Report, had noted in an 
earlier law review article that the perceived dysfunction of protective committees could be 
attributed in large part to the fact that many creditors held negative value claims in 
reorganization cases. See William O. Douglas, Protective Committees in Railroad 
Reorganizations, 47 HARV. L. REV. 565, 567 (1934) (“In the first place, it took no great 
understanding of the mysteries of high finance to make obvious the futility of spending a 
thousand dollars to get a thousand dollars—or even less.”). 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id.  
 44. See id. at 567–68. 
 45. See id. at 586–87.  Foster’s proposal was emphatic if vague: 
Let machinery be provided for bondholder election of representatives by plurality 
or majority vote, or by cumulative voting, with open or closed primaries, with 
requirement that candidates disclose, or free themselves from, inconsistent 
interests; place limits upon campaign expenditures, et cetera. Then give the 
representatives thus chosen the power to bind their whole class by the bargain they 
will make. 
Roger S. Foster, Book Review, 43 YALE L.J. 352, 357 (1933). 
 46. See Douglas, supra note 41, at 586–89. 
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of insiders.47  He distrusted the motives of private lawyers but was 
otherwise agnostic about the ideal form of this champion.48  Douglas 
suggested that a private group, “permanently organized for respectable and 
competent patrol duty,” might come forward to serve that role.49  He also 
suggested that a government agency could step in as watchdog, although he 
labeled that an “extreme step” less favorable than increased committee 
democracy.50 
2.  Agency Supervision and the Demise of Group Representation 
Despite these proposals, the eventual reforms enacted by Congress did 
not invigorate committees, install checks and balances against insider 
control, or harness the powers of representative democracy.  Instead, the 
Chandler Act largely sidetracked committees in favor of what Douglas had 
once called the “extreme step” of agency supervision.51  Rather than 
resolution of a firm’s financial distress through an elaborate dance of group 
negotiation, the Chandler Act substituted a system of agency-supervised 
(although still court-centered) reorganization.  Chapter X of the Chandler 
Act was the statute’s showpiece.  That provision, designed for the 
resolution of large firms with publicly held securities, recast the 
reorganization process.  The statute denied formal recognition to 
committees representing creditors during bankruptcy proceedings.52  
Indeed, the statute limited the ability of ad hoc committees to solicit 
claimants in support of a plan of reorganization.53  At the same time, 
bankruptcy rules adopted at the instance of the SEC required extensive 
disclosures by ad hoc committees.54  In place of the incumbent management 
of the debtor acting together with protective committees, Chapter X cases 
 
 47. As his article explained, the lack of adequate leadership dampened any chance of 
mobilization by small stakeholders. See id. at 567 (“[T]he usual result was that this widely 
diffused and disorganized minority never mobilized, because of their inertia, lack of 
adequate leadership, or otherwise.”). 
 48. Douglas complained of reorganizations “effectuated by an incompetent and piratical 
group of the legal profession who as often as not did the security-holders even more 
disservice than would the old management or financial group.” See id. at 567. 
 49. Id. at 568.  Douglas gave the Shareholders’ Protection Association, an English 
organization, as an example upon which a suitable private watchdog group could be 
modeled.  
 50. Id. at 584. 
 51. For a discussion of the approach to corporate reorganization taken by the Chandler 
Act, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION:  A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN 
AMERICA 119–23 (2001). 
 52. Although committees had no formal role under Chapter X, the statute contemplated 
that committees might still be formed in some cases and receive compensation from the 
debtor’s estate.  See Chandler Act § 242, 52 Stat. 840, 900 (1938) (repealed 1978); see also 
Daniel J. Bussel, Coalition-Building Through Bankruptcy Creditors’ Committees, 43 UCLA 
L. REV. 1547, 1558 (1996). 
 53. Chandler Act §§ 175–176, 52 Stat. at 891.  
 54. Rule 10-211 in Chapter X cases required “detailed” disclosures to ensure greater 
control of “the personnel and activities of those acting in a representative capacity”—a 
provision intended to close off the reemergence of protective committees in disguise. 
13A LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 10-211.03 (14th ed. 1977). 
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were to be controlled by a neutral and independent trustee, acting with the 
expert assistance of the SEC.55  The trustee had the sole authority to 
formulate a plan of reorganization, although he could accept the input of 
creditors or other stakeholders in the case.56 
While a Chapter X bankruptcy remained a case brought before a court, 
the statute gave the SEC a favored role in the process.  The agency could 
examine the financial condition of the debtor and opine on any proposed 
plan of reorganization—in fact, a plan could not be considered by the court 
until the SEC filed its report assessing it.57  And no plan of reorganization 
could be sent to creditors for their approval unless the proposed plan was 
accompanied by the SEC’s view of its merits.58  Chapter X’s basic premises 
were twofold:  first, individual claimants could not effectively organize 
themselves into committees that served a meaningful function in 
reorganization cases; and second, the process of reorganizing a distressed 
firm was not a matter of group bargaining but a matter of careful study by 
neutral experts knowledgeable in the solutions to corporate and financial 
maladies. 
How did it come to pass that proposals for beefing up the role of 
committees turned into legislation that hobbled them?  The short answer is 
that the SEC Report had been received as a dossier on the futility of a 
robust committee system.  The lessons of the report were that widely 
scattered small investors had little incentive to monitor the development of 
a large firm’s reorganization, and that their indifference left the committee 
system open to inevitable commandeering by insiders.59  Rather than taking 
seriously the opportunity for greater representative democracy in the 
selection of committees, or for the creation of a watchdog with the limited 
role of monitoring the formation of committees, Congress took a more 
aggressive approach.  It removed the problems of committees by removing 
the committees altogether. 
B.  From Bankruptcy Reform to Class Action Reform 
Kalven and Rosenfield embraced the SEC Report’s insights and 
abstracted from them more general claims about group litigation.  In their 
article, they compared a creditor in bankruptcy to an employee with a wage 
and hour claim, a shareholder with a small securities fraud claim, a taxpayer 
 
 55. Chandler Act § 156, 52 Stat. at 888. 
 56. Id. § 167, 52 Stat. at 890. 
 57. Id. § 173, 52 Stat. at 891. 
 58. Id. § 175, 52 Stat. at 891. 
 59. The statute treated small business bankruptcies differently.  In a separate provision, 
Chapter XI, the Chandler Act provided for the creation of creditors’ committees in cases 
seeking an “arrangement” of the debtor’s financial affairs.  Chapter XI was designed for the 
reorganization of firms with trade creditors but without publicly held securities.  See SKEEL, 
supra note 51, at 162–63.  The drafters of the Chandler Act apparently assumed that, unlike 
small investors such as bondholders, trade creditors had the savvy and the economic 
incentives to play a meaningful role in the debtor’s reorganization. See SEC v. Am. Trailer 
Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 613–14 (1965). 
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challenging an illegal assessment, and a businessman with a modest 
antitrust claim.  They argued that each aggrieved claimant, “like the 
investor in the reorganization, finds himself inadvertently holding a small 
stake in a large controversy.”60  The SEC’s description of the isolated and 
helpless claimant, they asserted, “applies equally well” to these situations.61 
So it is not surprising that the authors also embraced the SEC Report’s 
skepticism of group representation through committees.  As they 
forthrightly acknowledged, “the committee is in considerable disrepute at 
the moment” because “the tremendous volume of experience with 
reorganization committees during the depression years was 
disillusioning.”62  They summed up the prevailing wisdom about the use of 
committees in group resolution:  “In brief, in the one type of case in which 
the committee has been used extensively, it has been tried and found 
wanting.”63 
Because committees had been so completely discredited at the time of 
their writing, Kalven and Rosenfield understandably looked elsewhere for a 
model of group litigation.  The model they developed called for essentially 
no participation by members of the group.64  Instead, a single, self-
nominated representative would prosecute the case on behalf of the group.  
In keeping with the era, Kalven and Rosenfield turned away from tinkering 
with democracy and reframed the institutional design question of group 
representation as solely about the choice of expert representative in 
litigation.  The choice they presented was between a public agency and a 
private lawyer.65  In light of the lessons they drew from the SEC Report, 
one might have expected them to favor the agency representative over the 
private lawyer.  Indeed, they referred approvingly to the SEC’s role in 
Chapter X cases as an example of the superiority of an agency to a private 
lawyer in some circumstance.66  They noted that the “reorganization bar, 
like the reorganization committee, was not altogether satisfactory in 
discharging the semi-public responsibility thrust upon it by the 
reorganization process.”67  Nevertheless, Kalven and Rosenfield recognized 
that the private lawyer had a substantial monetary incentive to pursue 
litigation that an agency might not pursue.68  Although they praised the 
 
 60. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 13, at 684. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 689. 
 63. Id. 
 64. They distinguished the class action from a committee structure by the role played by 
claimants during the litigation. See id. at 691 (“The chief difference between this method and 
the committee method is simply that instead of mobilizing the plaintiffs prior to trial, their 
participation in the case is deferred until a decision is reached.”).   
 65. Id. at 715. 
 66. Kalven and Rosenfield cited the “activity of the SEC in reorganizations under 
Chapter X of the Chandler Act [a]s further evidence” of the “distrust of the competency of 
private litigation to determine adequately questions of public importance.” Id. at 719 & 
n.101. 
 67. Id. at 719. 
 68. See id. at 717–18. 
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trend of “genuinely excellent” legal staffs at agencies,69 they harbored some 
doubts about the limitations of public enforcement of rights due to the 
inevitable limitation of resources experienced by agencies and the lack of “a 
true civil servant attitude in America.”70  The answer, they suggested, was 
not to rest exclusively on either public agencies or private lawyers but to 
draw from both for the enforcement of rights.71 
The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit had a profound influence 
on the version of Rule 23 promulgated in 1966.  The reframing of the 
categories of class actions and the creation of an opt-out class can be traced 
to their criticisms of the 1938 version of the Rule.72  They also clarified the 
basic justification of class actions reflected in the 1966 Rule:  that the 
device could serve to protect rights that might otherwise be unenforced due 
to negative value claims and the limited resources of public agencies.73  At 
the same time, the move away from committee representation was ensured 
by their assessment of the failings of the pre–New Deal bankruptcy process. 
II.  RETHINKING GROUP REPRESENTATION IN BANKRUPTCY 
Ironically, the modern bankruptcy process has largely undone the New 
Deal era reforms on which Kalven and Rosenfield drew.  With the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code74 (and, in particular, the provisions of Chapter 11 of the 
Code that govern the reorganization of firms), Congress turned away from 
the basic design of bankruptcy adopted in the 1930s.  Today, a business 
reorganization in bankruptcy looks like a pre–New Deal reorganization in 
significant respects.  A trustee is not required in most Chapter 11 cases, and 
therefore the incumbent management of the debtor remains in possession of 
the business during the case.75  Creditors, and sometimes equity holders, are 
represented by a system of officially recognized committees.76  These 
committees play a role in monitoring the debtor and negotiating the 
formulation of a plan of reorganization.  The SEC no longer hovers above 
as a pervasive supervisor.77 
 
 69. Id. at 718. 
 70. Id. at 720–21.  Their principal fear was the continued existence of patronage 
appointments in government agencies. See id. at 720.  
 71. Id. at 721. 
 72. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 380 n.89, 385 n.114 (citing Kalven and Rosenfield, 
supra note 13, favorably in discussing the inadequacy of the previous version of the Rule). 
 73. See Nagareda, supra note 17, at 603. 
 74. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as 
amended at 11 U.S.C.).  
 75. The debtor in possession has (with limited exceptions) the powers and obligations of 
a trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2006).  
 76. See id. § 1102(a). 
 77. The U.S. Trustee program, which is housed within the Department of Justice, serves 
a much less intrusive monitoring function in Chapter 11 cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2006) 
(setting forth the duties of the U.S. Trustee).  In large business reorganization cases, the 
agency’s most prominent role is often that of watchdog over the compensation of 
professionals.  Id. § 586(a)(3)(A).  
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A.  Agency Supervision and Its Discontents 
The story of why those reforms were abandoned after forty years is 
instructive.78  By 1978, Chapter X was seen as a failure.  It was too slow 
and inhospitable for its intended job of reorganizing large firms.  Those 
firms that could get away with doing so sought to squeeze themselves into a 
separate part of the Chandler Act originally designed for small businesses.  
Under that competing provision, incumbent managers were allowed to 
remain in possession of the business and creditors’ committees played an 
active role in negotiating the debtor’s fate.79  In part this slow undermining 
of Chapter X resulted from politically imposed constraints—the SEC lacked 
the resources to perform its assigned tasks in bankruptcy cases because of 
restrictive budgets.80 
But the abandonment of the New Deal model of bankruptcy 
reorganization can also be seen as a reassessment of the role of individual 
claimants in bankruptcy.  Recall that the Chandler Act reforms, informed by 
the SEC Report, viewed the pre–New Deal system of creditor 
representation as a sham.81  Those reforms were premised on the perception 
that widely dispersed claimants were unlikely to play a meaningful role in 
the process, and so committees invited usurpation by conflicted insiders.  
Better, then, to discard the committees and impose powerful experts to 
supervise the reorganization in order to protect small investors.  That 
assumption became less persuasive over time in the decades after the 
Chandler Act’s enactment. 
While the old protective committees may have opened the process to 
excessive insider control, the committees also played another crucial 
function.  They served as facilitators of group resolution in business 
reorganizations.  For a variety of reasons—both historical and practical—
the American process of business reorganization in bankruptcy remains 
court centered.  We speak of bankruptcy “cases” that are filed in court and 
presided over by judges.  But the bankruptcy process at its core is a process 
of negotiation.82  Formal adjudication plays a limited role in even the most 
complex business reorganization.83  Instead, bankruptcy involves a 
complicated, multipolar process of group resolution.  A debtor seeking to 
reshape its capital structure will need to take into account the positions of 
multiple parties in interest, each potentially a source of cooperation or 
contestation. 
 
 78. See SKEEL, supra note 51, at 160–83; see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Welcome Back, 
SEC?, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 573, 574–76 (2010). 
 79. This alternative, simplified form of business bankruptcy was contained in Chapter 
XI of the Chandler Act. See supra note 59. 
 80. See SKEEL, supra note 51, at 170–71 (explaining the budgetary constraints imposed 
on the SEC beginning in the Eisenhower administration). 
 81. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text. 
 82. Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 92 
(2004). 
 83. Id.  
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Chapter X, on the other hand, made effective resolution more difficult 
because it was not a process designed to facilitate negotiation.  At bottom, 
the drafters of the Chandler Act viewed business reorganization as a matter 
of agency expertise and not group negotiation.84  The reality of resolving a 
firm’s financial distress, however, showed that assumption to be unsound—
or at least incomplete. 
Even among those claimants in a bankruptcy who might be considered 
small and scattered, the creation of a representative committee could further 
their interests for at least two reasons.  First, some groups might contain a 
mixture of claimants with different incentives to pursue their claims.  A 
group of unsecured creditors in a large bankruptcy case might comprise 
some creditors with insignificant claims as well as creditors with substantial 
claims.  For example, a company’s unsecured creditors might include 
bondholders with very large claims as well as creditors with small contract 
claims.  Treating all of those creditors as helpless or indifferent would 
overlook the obvious benefits that could be realized by harnessing the 
energy of those willing and able to represent the group as a way of 
indirectly serving their own interests.  If selected as representatives of other 
creditors, they might benefit the larger group while pursuing their own 
ends.  Second, groups of creditors vary widely in their relative levels of 
sophistication.  A properly designed system of group representation could 
draw on the savvy of some creditors in a way that would serve the interests 
of a larger group of unsophisticated creditors.  In other words, the very 
heterogeneity of creditors in bankruptcy could be harnessed to protect the 
interests of the group. 
B.  Returning Group Representation to Business Reorganization Cases 
The current Chapter 11 process attempts to achieve what William O. 
Douglas had suggested before he wrote the SEC Report—a more vigorous 
and independent committee to represent creditors.  Under the Code, the 
U.S. Trustee, an administrative agency, appoints a committee of unsecured 
creditors comprising holders of the largest claims against the debtor.85  The 
U.S. Trustee acts as a neutral entity responsible for selecting the members 
of the committee (and also for deciding whether additional representative 
 
 84. The conception of the bankruptcy process embodied in the Chandler Act is reflected 
in the comments of Jerome Frank after the statute’s enactment.  In response to complaints 
about the intrusive role of the SEC in bankruptcy cases, Frank rejected the proposition that 
reorganizations are a matter of private litigation.  Instead, he insisted that a “reorganization is 
something more than a brawl, and that it is an administrative problem in the solution of 
which the public, as well as the litigants, has an interest.” Jerome Frank, Epithetical 
Jurisprudence and the Work of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the 
Administration of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 18 N.Y.U. L. REV. 317, 321–22 (1941).  
 85. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1), (b)(1) (2006).  The office of the U.S. Trustee sends 
questionnaires to the largest creditors disclosed on the debtor’s schedule of creditors 
submitted when the debtor files a Chapter 11 petition.  The questionnaire asks whether 
creditors would like to serve on the committee of unsecured creditors. See Roberta A. 
DeAngelis & Nan Roberts Eitel, Committee Formation and Reformation: Considerations 
and Best Practices, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2011, at 20, 20. 
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committees are warranted).  The office typically selects creditors based on 
the size and nature of their claims.86  In turn, the members of the committee 
are fiduciaries for the larger group of creditors they represent.87  Thus, the 
committee is expected to take a significant role in monitoring the debtor 
and in negotiating the resolution of the case.88  The committee therefore 
gains access to confidential and proprietary information about the debtor’s 
affairs.89  It can investigate claims against the debtor’s managers or third 
parties90 and seek permission to pursue those claims if the debtor refuses to 
do so.91 
The modern creditors’ committee sometimes acts as a mini-legislative 
body expressing the voice of the larger group of creditors.  Because courts 
tend to place great weight on the views of the committee, its decision to 
take a position in favor of, or against, a particular development in the case is 
significant.92  A unanimous vote of a committee sends a very different 
signal from a closely divided vote.93 
This is not to say that the role of committees in bankruptcy cases is all 
sweetness and light.  Because official committees are granted both 
significant information about the debtor’s case and a significant voice in its 
outcome, a member of the committee may seek to commandeer it for purely 
 
 86. See Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical 
Analysis of the Role of Creditors’ Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. 
REV. 747, 763 (2011) (discussing the selection and composition of creditors’ committees). 
 87. See In re Firstplus Fin., Inc., 254 B.R. 888, 894 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).  There is, 
of course, disagreement about whether and to what extent the fiduciary model of the 
creditors’ committee is appropriate. See Bussel, supra note 52, at 1562–70 (comparing 
fiduciary and quasi-legislative models of creditors’ committees). 
 88. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 401 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6357 (explaining that committees “will be the primary negotiating bodies for the formulation 
of the plan of reorganization” and “will also provide supervision of the debtor in possession  
. . . and will protect their constituents’ interests”). 
 89. See Harner & Marincic, supra note 86, at 763–64. 
 90. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2) (providing that the committee may “investigate the acts, 
conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor’s 
business and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and any other matter 
relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan”).  The three basic functions of a 
creditors’ committee are to monitor the debtor’s operations, investigate potential claims 
against insiders, and negotiate the plan. In re Cumberland Farms, Inc., 154 B.R. 9, 12 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1993). 
 91. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creds. of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics 
Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 580 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (concluding that a creditors’ 
committee has standing to bring a fraudulent conveyance claim that the debtor in possession 
declined to pursue). 
 92. See Harner & Marincic, supra note 86, at 764. 
 93. To give a prominent example, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 
New York granted a contested motion to transfer venue in the Patriot Coal bankruptcy when 
the committee voted 4–3 to oppose the motion. In re Patriot Coal Corp., 482 B.R. 718, 724 
n.5, 755 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).  When a similar motion was denied in the Enron 
bankruptcy, the committee had voted unanimously to oppose it. In re Enron Corp., 274 B.R. 
327, 345 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he Court finds it relevant to weigh the position of the 
Committee in its statutory role as a fiduciary to and representative body of the unsecured 
creditors.”). 
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self-interested reasons.94  More fundamentally, the ancient concerns about 
committees that are formed more for the benefit of reorganization 
professionals than of represented claimants still linger.95  The issue of 
committee control, in other words, has not been resolved in all cases.  
Relatedly, the rise of claims trading in bankruptcy has produced the 
phenomenon of committees that play a significant role in bankruptcy cases 
despite a lack of formal recognition.  It is not uncommon for sophisticated 
hedge funds to buy up tranches of smaller claims and then seek to have 
their voices heard in the case under the guise of an “ad hoc” committee of 
claimants.96 
But turning from the world of bankruptcy to the world of aggregate 
litigation suggests that bankruptcy is much richer, relatively speaking, in its 
appreciation of the variety of choices in group representation.  The class 
action remains molded by the conceptual framework of Kalven and 
Rosenfield, and that framework gives short shrift to group representation 
outside the single lawyer acting on behalf of the group without further 
input.  In a world that has moved beyond aggregation through the class 
action, however, that conceptual gap presents an opportunity for different 
approaches to representation. 
III.  THE HELPLESS GROUP IN AGGREGATE LITIGATION 
What, then, of group representation in aggregate litigation more 
generally?  The possibilities of more flexible arrangements in the class 
action may be limited.  But the new world of nonclass aggregation presents, 
perhaps, greater room for enhanced claimant representation. 
A.  The Problem of Group Representation in the Class Action 
The problem of claimant representation in the class action stems first 
from the emphasis on negative value claims as ideally suited for class 
resolution.  The idealization of the negative value claim—Kalven and 
Rosenfield’s contribution—rests on the notion that class members are 
rationally indifferent to the prosecution of their claims.  Indeed, Rule 
23(b)(3) requires a court considering the certification of a damages class to 
weigh the class members’ interest in individually controlling their 
 
 94. See Harner & Marincic, supra note 86, at 763–67 (observing that a “self-interested 
committee can skew the court’s and outside parties’ perspectives of the Chapter 11 case and 
foster a resolution that might not maximize value” and giving examples). 
 95. In a recent case, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware disqualified 
counsel from representing a creditors’ committee based on allegations that the attorneys had 
manipulated the process of committee formation in order to assure their retention as 
committee counsel. In re Universal Bldg. Prods., 486 B.R. 650 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).  
 96. The principal question presented by these ad hoc committees is whether they should 
disclose their members’ economic interests. See In re N.W. Airlines Corp., 363 B.R. 701, 
701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).  Whether these committees should have fiduciary duties in 
bankruptcy cases is another contested question. See generally David L. Perechocky, Should 
Ad Hoc Committees Have Fiduciary Duties?:  Judicial Regulation of the Bankruptcy 
Market, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 527 (2012). 
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claims97—a factor that favors the certification of negative value claims.  
When class members’ claims appear to be more valuable, however, 
certification is disfavored on the view that separate actions would be 
preferable.98  Indeed, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor the Supreme 
Court acknowledged that “[w]hile the text of Rule 23(b)(3) does not 
exclude from certification cases in which individual damages run high, the 
Advisory Committee had dominantly in mind vindication of ‘the rights of 
groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to 
bring their opponents into court at all.’”99 
Although that reasoning flows from Kalven and Rosenfield’s emphasis 
on rights enforcement as the true function of the class action, it greatly 
diminishes the possibility of group representation in the class action.  It 
presents as a necessary result of the decision to aggregate that claimants 
will exercise no role in the case.  Or, to put the logic somewhat differently, 
it holds that only the helpless group deserves the benefits of aggregation.  
But it is odd to say that the possibility of some enforcement of rights 
without aggregation negates the benefits of aggregation.  To be sure, the 
group with negative value claims may receive the most benefits from 
aggregation, but that does not mean that a group with more valuable claims 
deserves none of those benefits.100  In a typical bankruptcy, the group of 
unsecured creditors may include, say, individuals with potentially valuable 
claims.  That possibility would not be invoked to dismiss the need for a 
committee of unsecured creditors to represent the group.  Of course, in 
bankruptcy, the need for aggregation in the first instance is taken as a given.  
The proper form of representation is a separate question of institutional 
design.  The class action, on the other hand, collapses those analytically 
distinct questions into a single inquiry. 
The development of a more stringent commonality threshold for class 
certification presents a second barrier to group representation in the class 
action.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,101 
arguably diminishes the variance or “spread” among class members with 
respect to their individual characteristics.  If class members must be 
uniform in more dimensions, it is harder to justify the need for some form 
of group representation.  Combined with the preference for negative value 
 
 97. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A) (providing that “the class members’ interests in 
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions” is a factor in 
determining whether to certify the class). 
 98. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997). 
 99. Id. (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 
497, 497 (1969)). 
 100. Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. made this point by 
noting the saved transactions costs in a class action that would benefit class members, even 
though their asbestos personal injury claims were not negative value claims. 527 U.S. 815, 
882–83 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that the resolution of claims under the 
proposed class action carried transaction costs of only 15 percent, while piecemeal litigation 
imposed transaction costs of 61 percent). 
 101. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
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claims, the tightening of commonality makes the potential benefits of group 
representation in the class action context less plausible. 
B.  The Possibility of Group Representation in 
Nonclass Aggregate Litigation 
Freed from the conceptual and doctrinal constraints of the class action, 
however, aggregate litigation presents the possibility of greater group 
representation in litigation.  Indeed, the very reasons for procedural 
aggregation’s move beyond the formal boundaries of the class action 
provide justifications for exploring greater group representation.  There is 
already a developing literature exploring some of the forms that group 
representation might take.102  But it is worth considering why group 
representation may provide greater benefits outside the class action.  Three 
features of the new world of nonclass aggregations in particular—the size 
of claims, the variance in claimants, and the realities of settlement—invite 
group representation. 
The increased judicial scrutiny of class certification has caused the turn 
toward nonclass aggregation.  The difficulty of bringing a mass tort class 
action after the Supreme Court’s Amchem and Ortiz decisions, for example, 
left lawyers involved in that category of cases to find some other form of 
procedural aggregation.103  In recent years, class action lawyers have 
explored the construction of aggregate litigation through the use of 
coordinated proceedings under the Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) statute 
followed by a global settlement.104  Once the MDL process brings cases 
presenting a common question of fact together for pretrial proceedings in 
one forum, the judge presiding over the cases guides the litigation toward 
settlement—a form of aggregation sometimes labeled the “quasi-class 
action.”105  Certification of a class action is not required, because each 
plaintiff whose claim is centralized in the MDL court has a separate action 
and is separately represented by counsel.106  Negotiations among plaintiffs’ 
lawyers and their adversaries will then lead to a master settlement 
agreement to govern the resolution of each plaintiff’s claim.  Two of the 
most prominent examples of this form of nonclass aggregation followed the 
 
 102. See, e.g., Burch, Litigating Together, supra note 15. 
 103. See id. at 94 (“The upshot of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Amchem Products, 
Inc. v. Windsor and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., and of Congress passing the Class Action 
Fairness Act (CAFA), is that few mass-tort cases will proceed as certified class actions.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 104. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006) (permitting the transfer of cases that involve one or more 
common questions of fact to a single judicial district for pretrial proceedings). 
 105. The judge may encourage the resolution of the litigation by a series of maneuvers, 
including selecting and trying “bellwether” cases to test the strength of claims or defenses 
and by choosing a steering committee of plaintiffs’ counsel to take the lead in the litigation.  
Finally, the judge may seek to adjust the compensation of counsel for plaintiffs, even though 
there is no express power to do so as in a class action. See generally Charles Silver & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi–Class Action Method of Managing Multi-district Litigations:  
Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 105 (2010). 
 106. To be sure, a single law firm may represent a large inventory of individual plaintiffs. 
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Vioxx and Zyprexa mass tort litigations.107  In both litigations, the presence 
of individual questions relating to each claimant’s harm, combined with the 
high potential value of their claims, defeated certification of a standard class 
action. 
1.  Positive Value Claims 
The features of nonclass aggregation that present stumbling blocks to 
class certification, however, also make the possibility of group 
representation more attractive.  First, consider the presence of positive value 
claims.  The likelihood that some claimants hold valuable claims that could 
be pursued separately weighs heavily against certification of a mass tort.108 
But the presence of claimants with high dollar claims raises the 
likelihood that a group of claimant representatives will have a heightened 
interest in the litigation.  Much as a creditors’ committee in a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy case may comprise those creditors with particularly valuable 
claims against the debtor, a claimant committee in a mass tort litigation 
might seek out a similar composition.  The role such a committee could 
play is wide ranging:  it could act as a voice of the larger group of claimants 
or simply as a locus for greater cooperation and communication among 
claimants.109 
2.  Nonuniformity 
Second, consider the lack of uniformity across claimants in nonclass 
aggregate litigation.  In the class action context, greater variance among 
claimants decreases the likelihood that the group will satisfy the level of 
cohesion required for certification under Rule 23.  In the Vioxx litigation, 
for example, class certification was doomed by the presence of individual 
harm and causation differences across the group alleging injury from the 
drug.110 
A somewhat variegated group of claimants, however, may nevertheless 
make use of group representation.  Again, recall that in a Chapter 11 case, 
the official committee of unsecured creditors may reflect a variety of 
creditor characteristics.  The creditors’ committee of an industrial 
corporation, for example, might comprise bondholders, major vendors, 
toxic tort claimants, and labor representatives.  That variety enhances the 
usefulness of the committee, because the committee’s deliberations may 
 
 107. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 608–10 (E.D. La. 2008) 
(describing the background of the litigation); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 
2d 488, 490–91 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (same). 
 108. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
 109. For a detailed account of some of these possibilities, see Burch, Litigating Together, 
supra note 15. 
 110. See In re Vioxx Prods Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 458–63 (E.D. La. 2006) 
(denying class certification). 
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help to test whether potential fissures among various claimants are actually 
significant.111 
3.  Settlement 
Finally, the reality of settlement in nonclass aggregate litigation provides 
another opening for group representation.  The end goal of recent MDL 
mass tort litigation has been a master settlement reached after negotiation 
between plaintiffs’ lawyers and their adversaries.112  Procedural rules 
should recognize the realities of litigation practice, and that should mean an 
appreciation for the negotiation of a global resolution in nonclass aggregate 
litigation.113  The negotiation of a global resolution is a key role of the 
committee structure in business reorganizations.114  It is not hard to imagine 
a similar role for a claimant committee in nonclass aggregate litigation.  A 
limited participation right of group representatives at the settlement stage 
could serve to ease the formulation of a settlement scheme acceptable to the 
broadest cross section of claimants.115 
CONCLUSION 
While the modern class action was conceived as the protector of helpless 
groups, the emerging form of nonclass aggregate litigation does not need to 
follow that conceptual path.  Concern about group helplessness in aggregate 
proceedings may confuse and confound rather than enlighten.  Indeed, the 
history of business reorganization law in the twentieth century is a story of 
the mistaken overemphasis on the helplessness of claimants and the 
eventual correction of that mistake.  The possibilities of group 
representation should not be overlooked on the assumption that the group is 
simply unable or unwilling to protect itself.  Rather, a realistic assessment 
of the composition of groups in nonclass aggregation suggests that some 
form of group representation, like that in business reorganizations, is viable.  
Particularly when the group includes claimants with high value claims, the 
group is variegated in its characteristics, and settlement is the end goal of 
litigation, group representation may provide a benefit to claimants as a 
whole. 
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